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Legal Rights of Refugees:
Two Case Studies and Some
Proposals for a Strategy
Steven M. Schneebaum*

What rights of refugees are legal rights?
In a recent decision of far-reaching implications, Filartigav. Pena-Irala,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit not only identified one such right, but provided invaluable guidance as to how the
broader question is to be addressed. This essay offers an analysis of the
decision in Filarh'a,as well as a case presenting intriguing points of comparison, Tran Qui Than v. Blumenthal. 2 It then proposes several generalizations concerning the identification of legal rights of refugees, suggesting a
strategy for their enforcement, the upshot of which is this: creative marshalling and invocation of rights well established in the American legal
tradition are the key to major breakthroughs of the Filarhgavariety. Lawyers representing refugees hold that key in their hands. It is their responsibility to use it.

INTRODUCTION
Ubi jus, ibi remedium. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. The Latin
maxim is not a utopian description of an ideal legal system never to be
found on Earth. It is, rather, a definition, a statement of the sort described
by philosophers as "analytic." 3 It depends upon no empirical evidence to
establish its truth, nor can developments, however bizarre, in the history
of jurisprudence constitute a challenge to its universality.
The term jus in the maxim has a much more limited sense than the
English word "right." 4 The Latin word brings with it the trappings of legal
right, and hence has meaning only within a definite legal system. 5 It does
. B.A. Yale; M.A. Oberlin; B.A. Oxford; M.C.L. (A.P.) George Washington University;
attorney with the firm of Patton, Boggs & Blow in Washington, D.C. Mr. Schneebaum
represented three amid curiae in Filarhiga v. Pena-Irala.
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not follow, however, that one can compile an exhaustive catalog of a
system's legal rights through an investigation of remedies actually provided by its statutes or ordered by its courts. Unhappily, judges make
mistakes, and for a wide variety of reasons, fundamental rights may never
be tested. Interpretations of unchanging texts may fluctuate dramatically,
and rights (and hence remedies) may be found lurking in statutory language consistently thought to be barren.
To speak of a legal right, however, is to indicate the availability of a
legal remedy for its enforcement. If such a remedy cannot be devised-if,
for example, it would conflict with other even more fundamental norms
of the legal system, or if no mechanism exists in the system for providing
it-then the reference to a legal right needs to be revised or eliminated. The
impossibility of a remedy is inconsistent with the existence of a legal right.
Abandoning the claim that one enjoys a legal right of a certain nature,
of course, in no way entails a lessened commitment to moral or political
objectives. Indeed, it may be the very realization that no such legal right
exists that impels citizens to attempt political action which would establish
it. But in exploring here the legal rights of refugees, the primary emphasis
is on isolating and identifying precise enforceable rights that judges will
recognize, and not on articulating policy objectives, however desirable,
that would require additional definition or legislative action. These are
rights now vouchsafed to individuals by the existing American legal system. The Fiartigacourt pointed the way to a cache of such legal rights that
has lain undiscovered virtually since the earliest days of the Republic. The
lesson to be learned from Tran Qui Than is that judges may still fail to
acknowledge fundamental rights, especially when they are concealed in a
tangled thicket of statutes and regulations.
FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA: INTERNATIONAL
SOURCES OF LEGAL RIGHTS
The Facts and the Decision

6

On March 29, 1976, seventeen-year old Joelito Filartiga disappeared from
his home in Asuncion, Paraguay. His father, Dr. Joel Filartiga, is a physician and artist who has for years been a vocal dissident from the policies
of Paraguay's president, General Alfredo Stroessner. During the night
following Joelito's disappearance, his sister, Dolly Filartiga, was taken by
police officers to the home of Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, inspector
general of the Asuncion police. There she was shown the body of her
brother, who had apparently been tortured to death. Dolly Filartiga stated
that Pena screamed at her as she ran in horror from the house, "Here you
have what you have been looking for for so long and what you deserve."
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The Filartigas believe-and believe they can prove-that Pena systematically and purposely tortured Joelito in retaliation for his father's
political activities. Soon after Joelito's death, Dr. Filartiga began a criminal
action in Asuncion against Pena. From 1976 until 1979, no progress took
place in that proceeding. Although in 1979 it was reported on Pena's behalf
that the case was about to be considered, it is unclear whether any further
steps have in fact taken place. Dr. Filartiga's lawyer was, however, allegedly arrested and threatened with death by Pena, and he was subsequently
disbarred. 7
More than two years after the murder of Joelito, Pena and his mistress
applied for and were granted visitors' visas to enter the United States. Once
in the country, they overstayed the terms of their entry permits, and set
up house in New York City. Dolly Filartiga, too, came to the United States
in 1978. Through a mutual acquaintance, she learned of Pena's presence
in New York, and reported it to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Pena was arrested and ordered to be deported, being held pending
execution of that order in detention facilities at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.
Ms. Filartiga began to consult attorneys in Washington, D.C. and in
New York to determine whether a means existed for asserting Pena's civil
liability for the wrongful death of Joelito. On April 6, 1979, she caused
Pena to be personally served at the Brooklyn Navy Yard with a summons
and complaint. 8 The complaint, brought in her father's name as well as her
own, 9 alleged as the sources of jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ("federal
question" jurisdiction), as well as the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1350. The Filartigas asked for damages of $10 million, and also sought to
enjoin the deportation of Pena pending disposition of the lawsuit. 10
From the outset, the focus of the defendant's motion to dismiss the
action was subject-matter jurisdiction, and especially that alleged under
the Alien Tort Claims Act. That statute, originally enacted as section 9 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789,11 in its modem form provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.
No party disputed the contention that the Pilarhgaplaintiffs were aliens, or
the description of the suit as one "for a tort only." Issue was joined only
with respect to whether the tort Pena was alleged to have committed
constituted a "violation of the law of nations," or, to use the more current
vocabulary, of international law.
On May 15, 1979, Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of the United States
District Court for the Eistern District of New York granted defendant's
motion. Acknowledging what he called the "strength" 12 of plaintiffs' ar-
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guments for a general prohibition of torture in international law, the judge
stated that earlier decisions restricted the scope of applicable international
norms to situations in which actor and victim are not of the same nationality. Plaintiffs were unable to persuade either the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit or the United States Supreme Court to extend the brief stay
of deportation granted by Judge Nickerson, and Pena was returned to
Paraguay during the last week in May. 13
The dismissal of the action was appealed to the court of appeals. The
plaintiffs, as well as human rights groups as amici curiae, submitted briefs
urging reversal. 14 During the course of oral argument, on October 16,
1979, the court sua sponte invited the Department of State to submit a
memorandum. A brief for the United States as amicus curiae was filed on
May 29, 1980, firmly supporting plaintiffs' position. On June 30, 1980, the
court of appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Kaufman, reversed the
dismissal below, and remanded the case for trial on the merits. ' 5 The court
held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority
violates universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties." 16 Of even greater
significance for this analysis was the court's conclusion that "international
law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments." 17 Thus the jurisdictional prerequisites of 28 U.S.C. § 1350 were
satisfied: plaintiffs, who were aliens, complained of a tort which constitutes a violation of the law of nations.
An appreciation of the enormous importance of the Filarfiga decision
requires a brief summary of earlier cases in which the Alien Tort Claims
Act has been invoked.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 Before Filartiga
Speaking in support of the Judiciary Act then before the first Congress,
Representative John Vining of Delaware stated that he
wished to see justice so equally distributed, as that every citizen of the
United States be fairly dealt by, and so impartially administered, that every
subject or citizen of the world whether foreigner or alien, friend or foe should
be alike satisfied; by this means, the doors of justice would be thrown open,
immigration would be encouraged from all countries into your own, and in
short, the United States of America would be made not only an asylum of
liberty, but a sanctuary of justice. 18
In enacting section 9 of the Judiciary Act, laying jurisdiction over certain
violations of "the law of nations" in the federal courts, Congress intended
to impose uniformity on the new nation's foreign relations. Indeed, the
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absence of guarantees of uniformity was a principal weakness of the Articles of Confederation. 19
In 1789, however, Congress did not question the notion that courts of
general jurisdiction (i.e., the state courts) could be seized of tort actions
when the defendants were physically present within their territory. The
international character of any alleged offense would have been simply
irrelevant. The effect of section 9 was not to create a new cause of action,
but merely to direct into the federal judicial system certain tort cases in
which decisions might be especially sensitive for the foreign policy of the
nation as a whole.
With this in mind, one might suppose that invocations of 28 U.S.C. §
1350 have been frequent or even routine. In fact, the opposite is true.
Before Pilarhga,the venerable statute had been the exclusive basis of federal
jurisdiction in only a single reported case. 20 In a handful of other cases
jurisdiction was denied, generally because the claimed norm of the law of
nations whose infringement was alleged had in fact not become enshrined
as an international legal principle. 21
The sole exception is Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Cliff. 22 In that case, the
plaintiff, a Lebanese national, and defendant, his divorced wife, clashed
over custody of the couple's daughter. Under the law governing the divorce, the father was entitled to retain custody. To defeat this result, Mrs.
Clift had absconded with the girl, obtaining a falsified passport for her to
facilitate entry into the United States. The United States District Court for
the District of Maryland held that the complaint alleged a tort, and that
while the tort itself was not a violation of international law, the defendant's modus operandidid involve such a violation: the knowing procurement
of a false passport. Ironically, the court, having taken jurisdiction, then
proceeded to deny the plaintiff the relief he requested, holding that to
remain with her mother in the United States would be in the girl's best
interests.
Adra was unique in the reliance on section 1350 as the source of jurisdiction. Courts have refused to find jurisdiction under that section in numerous labor disputes, 23 finding no right in international law of access to ports
unimpeded by picketing. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
held that the Warsaw Convention, regulating liability for airline accidents,
does not raise such accidents to the status of violations of international
law. 24
In Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,25 an alien seaman alleged that a shipowner's breach of the obligation of seaworthiness was a tort within section
1350. Rejecting that claim, the district court volunteered the view that a
violation of the law of nations must consist of
at least a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules or
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customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their common good
and/or dealings inter se. 26
This generalization, plainly an obiler dictum, was immediately accepted by
other courts as the key to interpreting the language of section 1350. Lopes
was relied upon heavily in the two Second Circuit cases-liT v. Vencap,
Ltd. 27 and Dreyfus v. von Finck28-which Judge Nickerson held compelled his
dismissal of Filartiga.In those cases, too, the broad dictum borrowed from
Lopes was far blunter than necessary to decide the issues presented. Thus
in liT,plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act for a
claim arising from a simple stock fraud. The court declined to hold "that
the Eighth Commandment 'Thou shalt not steal' is part of the law of
nations." 29 The Dreyfus plaintiff relied upon an act of expropriation as
constitutive of the "violation of the law of nations" required under section
1350. Again, the court of appeals held that the acts alleged, even if proved,
were not violations of international law or of any treaty of the United
States.
In none of these cases did the facts present a strong basis for section
1350 jurisdiction. In all of them, the holdings are perfectly consistent with
lines of cases establishing what are and what are not recognized international legal norms, since the allegations simply failed to meet the jurisdictional prerequisites. There was no violation of the law of nations in any
of these cases. In none of them, therefore, is the Lopes dictum limiting the
scope of the law of nations a necessary part of the decision. And yet, these
cases had the effect of enshrining Lopes as setting the limits of the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
Filartigadoes not overrule Lopes. Rather, it shows that the famous dictum,
far from restricting the applicability of section 1350, points in the direction
of its expansion. "[T]he Courts," wrote Judge Kaufman, "are not to prejudge the scope of the issues that the nations of the world may deem
30
important to their interrelationships, and thus to their common good."
The Lopes criterion, then, according to the Filartigacourt, allows section 1350
jurisdiction to be invoked on the basis of a flexible, changing view of just
31
what constitutes "the law of nations."
Freedom from torture, including torture by the state of the victim's own
nationality, has in the latter half of the twentieth century gradually but
definitely taken on the character of a right. As the Filarigacourt stated,
"Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations ...

is the right

to be free of physical torture." 3 2 Filartigaembodies that right as a legalright
in the American legal system. But this having been said, two questions
remain: What is the source of the legal right to be free from torture? What
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are the consequences for American law of considering the law of nations
as a creator of legal rights?
What Is the Source of the Legal Right
to Be Free From Torture?
Torture has, of course, been unanimously condemned by the nations of the
world in a series of treaties and resolutions. 33 Under a number of conventions, allegations of torture by a member state can be brought before
special international tribunals which are empowered to interpret and apply
international law, and to issue orders. Yet only extraordinarily can an
individual who claims to have been a victim of torture pursue remedies
against his or her own government.
Thus when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example,
speaks of the "right" to "security of person," it does not automatically
generate either a jus or a remedium. The Declaration is not a treaty, much less
a self-executing treaty directly enforceable by individuals against its signatory states. Other instruments to which the Filartigacourt turned for evidence of a consensual international norm condemning torture, with one
possible exception, are not treaties, do not bind the United States, or by
their language or by the terms of this country's adherence to them are not
self-executing.
The possible exception is the United Nations Charter. 34 A treaty, and
hence "the supreme law of the land" under Article VI of the Constitution,
the Charter does commit member states to "promote... universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights," and to "pledge themselves to take
joint and separate action" 35 to achieve this purpose. These articles have
been held not to "impose legal obligations on the individual member
nations or to create rights in private persons." 3 6 The Filarhga court expressed views on the Charter that suggest it may be willing, in an appropriate case, to reconsider whether the human rights articles are not
self-executing.
Despite the invitation of some of the amid curiae,37 the court declined to
assess the contention that torture is a violation of "a treaty of the United
States," and hence that jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 for that
reason. The answer to the question as to the source of the right to be free
from torture, the basis of the Filarligadecision, cannot be found in the
positive law of treaties, incorporated into United States law by the express
terms of the Constitution. It must instead be located in customary international law, whose means of ingress into the realm of judicially-enforceable
obligations is far more complex.
Since the earliest days of the Republic, the law of nations has been said
to be "part of" U.S. domestic law. The classic formulation is that of Mr.
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Justice Gray: "International law is part of our law and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
38
determination."
For many reasons, "questions of right" based upon the law of nations
have only rarely been presented to the federal courts. Not the least of these
reasons is the generally held but erroneous view that because individuals
are not "subjects" of international law, they cannot be held accountable
for violating its norms. Thus the law of nations would, in the typical case,
generate enforceable rights only against defendants which are states or
public entities. But these defendants have traditionally enjoyed the use of
powerful devices to deprive courts of jurisdiction over their persons (sovereign immunity) or over their acts (the "act of state" defense).
This view has always had to acknowledge myriad exceptions. The Constitution itself empowers Congress "to define and punish . . . offenses
against the Law of Nations." 39 As long ago as 1820, the Supreme Court
upheld against the charge of unconstitutional vagueness a statute codifying "the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations." 40 The courts
have consistently affirmed the congressional power to "flesh out" this
constitutional authority, in the form of federal laws, for example, against
interference with foreign diplomatic missions. 41 Acts committed by individuals have always been triable as violations of the law of war. 42
International developments over the last several decades have defined new
crimes under international law (sometimes called "crimes against humanity") which may be committed by individuals and for which the perpetrators are internationally responsible: genocide, certain war crimes, certain
treaty violations. 43
Yet virtually all of these "exceptions" to the general rule excluding
individuals from international obligations are instances of criminalresponsibility. There seems to be no body of law governing civil liability in
American or other municipal courts for acts which are violations of the law
of nations. To meet the prerequisites of section 1350, it is not logically
necessary that such a body of law be found. There is considerable authority for the proposition that a transitory tort is actionable wherever the
tortfeasor is found, and that an act committed abroad may be reviewed in
United States courts. The Filartigadecision turns on that authority. 44 In
Filarliga, the cause of action was a tort: assault, or trespass to the person.
Thus in Filarfiga,international law is invoked not primarily as generator of
a cause of action, but as a selector of jurisdiction-as a basis for federal
jurisdiction under section 1350, rather than the state court jurisdiction
available in the absence of the statute.
To appreciate the significance of this, it is necessary to recall what 28
U.S.C. § 1350 actually says. That statute does not create a new right of
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action for international offenses. Rather, it merely lays jurisdiction in the
district courts over actions for torts "committed in violation of the law of
nations." Filarh'gais a tort case, and the right that plaintiffs sought to have
vindicated is the common law right to be free of the tort of assault. The
Filarh'gacourt adopted the position, strongly urged on it by plaintiffs, that
on the facts alleged, "state court jurisdiction would be proper," 45 and that
through the Judiciary Act, Congress merely expressed its preference that
such cases, with potential significance for foreign relations, be heard in
federal courts.
In order for the court of appeals to reach this position, however, it was
not necessary to find international law to be part of the law of the United
States, creating a right to be free of torture. A simpler syllogism would
have sufficed:
(1) a tort case, otherwise actionable in courts of general jurisdiction,
may be brought in federal court if it alleges a violation of international law;
(2) an allegation of torture is sufficient to allege a violation of international law; and
(3) therefore, the court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
The Filarhigacourt does accept premises (1) and (2). The court seeks additional support for the conclusion, and goes on to show that international
law is part of our law, not because more premises are logically necessary,
but because of an unavoidable constitutional infirmity in jurisdiction
based only on this syllogism. It is in these next steps that the true significance of Filarligalies.
International Law as the Source of Domestic Legal Rights
Pena forcefully argued before the court of appeals that if the Alien Tort
Claims Act supports federal jurisdiction of a case brought between foreigners alleging no breach of a statute of the United States, such a grant
of authority to the courts exceeds what is permitted under the Constitution. Article III limits the "judicial power" inter alia to "all cases, in law and
equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." 4 6 There is,
generally, no federal common law of torts, and in any event, normal
conflicts of laws rules would have the law of Paraguay-the locus delici47
apply to the Filarfiga complaint.
It follows that exercise of jurisdiction in Filariga,in order to be constitutional, requires that "the laws of the United States" somehow be implicated. Here the conclusion that international law is part of the laws of this
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country is critical, for the allegation of torture, a violation of the law of
nations, is a charge that United States law, too, has been violated. Following the Supreme Court's directions in The Paquete Habana,48 the court of
appeals established the content of the international legal norm by examining international custom, practice, and the works of commentators. In so
doing it explored a corpus of international law which is necessarily a changing, developing one.
Analysis of international norms regarding torture leads to more than the
discovery of a right to be free of such barbarism, which right, incorporated
in United States law, becomes a jus enforceable in United States courts. It
also leads to certain conclusions concerning defenses which might be available in actions alleging infringement of that right. Torture contains as part
of its definition some degree of official sanction or complicity, actual or
apparent. It might therefore appear that the very facts that must be proved
by a plaintiff to constitute torture would be sufficient to establish the "act
of state" defense, the preclusion of judicial examination of a foreign government's act carried out within its own territory. 49 On this issue, the
Pilarfigacourt suggested that the defense will not apply: official renunciation of torture by virtually every nation of the world "does not strip the
tort of its character as an international law violation, if it in fact occurred
under color of government authority." 5 0 Or, as some of the amici put it,
"[n]o member of the international community can be heard to plead its
own depravity as a defense to the exercise of jurisdiction over its national
51
by an American court."
The defense of sovereign immunity did not arise in Filarhiga.Any assertion of it, however, by a defendant whose nation is prepared to endorse
him as its agent and his act as its official conduct, would presumably be
5 2
defeated for analogous reasons.
In Filarfiga, then, the court held that international law forbids torture,
that this prohibition gives rise to a legal right in individuals-assuming
they can meet the usual jurisdictional prerequisites-to enforce it through
civil actions in the courts of the United States. As has been shown, to
sustain the constitutionality of this exercise of federal jurisdiction, it was
necessary for the court to hold not only that torture is a violation of
international law, but also that international law is the source of the right
to be free from torture.
Under the F'lartiga analysis, international law may be the source of
individual rights, and as such is part and parcel of United States law. Rights
vouchsafed under federal law may be enforced in federal courts, however,
not only on the basis of the specialized Alien Tort Claims Act, but because
of the far broader constitutional grant of jurisdiction over "federal questions." In a tantalizing footnote, the Filartigacourt acknowledged that "our
reasoning might also sustain jurisdiction under the general federal question
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provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We prefer, however, to rest our decision upon
[§ 1350], in light of that provision's close coincidence with the jurisdictional facts presented in this case." 53
Plainly, that "close coincidence" formed no part of the court's opinion.
To the contrary, the Filartigacourt virtually read 28 U.S.C. § 1350 out of
the statute book. For in any case in which section 1350 jurisdiction might
constitutionally lie, the plaintiff must allege a violation of international
law, which is ipso facto an infringement of federal law. Where section 1350
does not apply, for example, because the plaintiff is not an alien or the case
not one "in tort only," section 1331 will nonetheless allow the invocation
in American courts of rights whose origin lies in international law.
Thus, on the strength of Filarhga,internationally generated rights may
be enforced by individuals in the United States courts. The identification
of such rights may not be a simple matter, but it is one to which the
creative attention of attorneys concerned with human rights should now
be turned.
In Filarhga,the court stated that "there are few, if any, issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so united as the limitation
on a state's power to torture persons held in its custody." 5 4 But other such
norms may be emerging, as the international community tends toward
consensus on them. Other rights of refugees-the right to return, should
they so wish, to their country of origin, or the right to be free of discrimination in their country of flight-may be capable of redress on the Filarhiga
model. These rights may have acquired, or may be acquiring, the status of
legal rights, protected by the full force of the United States courts. 55
The Paquele Habana5 6 states that international law is part of the law of the
United States. Filarliga makes it clear that, like the other fundamental
components of federal jurisprudence, international law is the source of
individual legal rights.
TRAN QUI THAN v. BLUMENTHAL: LEGAL
RIGHTS AND STATUTORY LIMITS
The Facts and the Decision
South Vietnam fell to Communist forces on April 30, 1975. As of midnight
on that day, South Vietnam became, by presidential order, a "designated
country" under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. 57 Beginning with
that date and time, property of South Vietnam or its nationals subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States was blocked, pursuant to the Trading
58
with the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended.
Some two weeks before the fall of Saigon, the directors of the Dong
Phuong Bank, including Trat Qui Than, met to consider what they should
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do. The directors adopted a resolution, effective on the date when Saigon
"will be occupied by the Communist government," granting to those directors "who will be able to leave the country [the power] to manage and
5 9
to make use of all of the ...properties that the [Bank] possesses abroad."
On May 1, 1975, the day following the takeover, and hence following
the effective date of the directors' resolution, the new government of South
Vietnam ordered that all banks be "confiscated and from now on, managed
by the revolutionary administration." Later, on August 30, 1975, according
to some accounts, the government allowed the banks to reopen for two
60
months, to "settle their accounts with depositors and shareholders."
October 30, 1975, marked the end of all private banking activity in Vietnam. 61
On the effective date of the regulations, the Dong Phuong Bank was
owed some $270,000 by the United States Departments of the Army and
Navy, as assignee of contractors in Vietnam. Directors holding a total of
56 percent of the bank's outstanding shares left Vietnam after the fall of
Saigon for France, Hong Kong, and the United States. Plaintiff Tran Qui
Than, who had been "Managing Director" of the bank, came to the United
States and established residence in California.
In late 1976, plaintiff sought to be paid the amounts owed to the bank,
invoking as the basis for his right to do so the resolution of April 15, 1975.
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) ruled that the payments
were blocked pursuant to the Foreign Assets Control Regulations. Plaintiff
sued to obtain review of that determination. The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California (per Schwarzer, J.) upheld the block62
ing.
The court reasoned that, irrespective of the ownership of the bank, the
assets in question were the bank's property. Since the bank was undoubtedly a Vietnamese "national," the assets were "property in which [Vietnam], or any national thereof, has at any time since [April 30, 1975] had
any interest," and were therefore properly blocked under 31 C.F.R. §
500.201. It was not for the court to pierce the bank's corporate veil, since
under Vietnamese law, nothing had occurred to cause the bank's assets to
devolve upon its individual shareholders. 63
Plaintiff argued that to maintain the blocking would be tantamount to
a conferral of extraterritorial effect upon the confiscatory acts of the revolutionary government. Generally, while the "act of state" doctrine precludes judicial review in the United States of official acts of foreign
sovereigns confined to their own territory, 64 "[o]ur courts will not give
'extraterritorial effect' to a confiscatory decree of a foreign state, even
where directed against its own nationals." 65 In Tran, the property in which
a Vietnamese interest was asserted by OFAC was located in the United
States. Plaintiff argued that since Vietnam as a state expropriating assets
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without compensation could not establish an enforceable claim to the
funds in United States courts, the presence of any interest on the part of
that country was negated.
Judge Schwarzer responded that this, "of course, is not the question
before the Court. Vietnam is not a party to this action, and the validity of
the confiscation is not in issue.... [F]he Court does not decide who will
be entitled to the funds." 6 6 With respect to the limited question held to
be ripe for decision in Tran, the court held that the Vietnamese nationality
of the bank, as well as the new government's claim to be the bank's
successor in interest, were sufficient to trigger application of the blocking
regulations.
Likewise, the court dismissed plaintiff's arguments that denial of a
license to unblock the assets was an unconstitutional "taking" without
compensation. A freezing of foreign assets, it held, is "only a temporary
action," 67 not a taking at all. More fundamentally, however, the court
found that plaintiff "has failed to establish that he and his fellow shareholders have a constitutionally protected property interest" 68 in the assets
at issue. Other legal claims-one based on equal protection and another
founded in a bilateral treaty with the Republic of Vietnam 69 -were summarily rejected.
An examination of the issues and assumptions underlying the Tran
decision, and an analysis of that decision in terms of legal rights, require
a brief discussion of the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations
The Foreign Assets Control Regulations are founded upon the statutory
power of the president, in times of "national emergency," "under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe," to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right,
power or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property
in which any [designated] foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States. 70
The establishment of regulations, the declaration of national emergencies,
and the extension of this authority to additional countries are essentially
foreign affairs functions of the president. The courts have therefore been
characteristically loath to assume a critical posture in construing this statutory language. The judicial branch has allowed extremely broad interpreta-
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tions of the term "interest," 71 has not questioned the continuous existence
of a "national emergency" for a quarter of a century, 72 and has repeatedly
sustained the constitutionality of the authority. 73 Yet the courts have
pointed out that even foreign affairs functions of the presidency must be
carried out within legal and constitutional limits. 74
To state this general proposition is not to ignore the line of cases-of
which UnitedStales v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation75 is the most frequently
cited-establishing the doctrine of judicial abstinence from political questions, and especially from those involving the foreign affairs functions of
the president. It is, rather, to acknowledge that it is Congress to whom
legislative power is assigned by the Constitution, and that, absent congressional authorization, even the president is without authority, for example,
to take private property for public use. 76 The power of the executive to
affect private rights through assets control programs is similarly limited by
constitutional constraints.
In Real v. Simon, 77 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit overturned a decision of the Office of Foreign Assets Control which
blocked part of a Cuban decedent's estate located in the United States.
Plaintiffs were the heirs claiming entitlement to the estate, and resided in
this country. The Cuban "interest" in the property alleged by OFAC to
justify the blocking was that of the decedent himself, since the applicable
regulation read, "a person shall be deemed78to have an interest in a decedent's estate if he ...

was the decedent."

The court acknowledged the latitude that will be accorded to the executive in establishing regulations under foreign affairs statutes. It noted,
however, the primacy even in such cases of law over presidential discretion. "The concept that a dead person is a 'foreign national' in possession
of property within the meaning of the Trading with the Enemy Act does
not have the support of logic." 79 Such an illogical result cannot lawfully
be reached by an agency, and is "akin to other agency actions that have
been found to have no basis in law." 8 0 The blocking of the estate was
reversed.
Two years later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was confronted with nearly identical facts in Richardson v. Simon. 81 So strong is the
presumption of propriety of presidential acts in the foreign affairs area that
the court, by a majority, declined to follow Real. No attempt was made to
distinguish the earlier case.
It does not appear, however, that the Richardson court differed from the
approach taken in Real. Rather, two members of the Richardson panel were
able to identify a policy basis for deeming a dead person to be a "foreign
national" under the regulations, which basis was held sufficient to justify
the result. Even Richardson, then, is not support for a claimed exception to
the general rules of administrative and constitutional law in the case of
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blocked assets; one must still acknowledge that there are limits. It would
not have been open to President Carter in November 1979, for example,
in blocking certain property of Iran, 82 to include the assets of persons born
in that country who had long since acquired United States citizenship. Nor
could he have attempted to recapture property already delivered to Americans in consummated transactions with nationals of Iran. 83
Assets control cases are thus not exceptions to the rule that not "every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance." 8 4 Assets control regulations, like any other set of legal rules,
must be consistent with the Constitution, and their reach cannot exceed
what the law allows.
The Tran case should be viewed against this background. Were the
Foreign Assets Control Regulations applied in Tran consistently with the
legal principles that must underlie those regulations? To put the question
another way, did plaintiff have rights that the Tran decision ignored?
What Rights Did Plaintiff Seek to Assert?
Tran Qui Than's position was straightforward. He claimed that, by virtue
of the April 15, 1975 resolution, the bank's property had become his. He,
after all, was a director of the Dong Phuong Bank who had been "able to
leave the country," and his application for an unblocking license certainly
constituted an attempt "to manage and to make use of" the bank's assets
in the United States. Tran could therefore argue that from the moment he
left Vietnam, as the grantee of an unrestricted power "to manage and to
make use of" certain specified property, he (and not the bank) was its
owner.
If in fact Tran was the owner of the claims, and if his ownership began
on or before the effective date of the regulations, it cannot be asserted that
there was a Vietnamese "interest" in the claims sufficient to sustain the
blocking. The blocking would work directly to defeat Tran's right of ownership. Judge Schwarzer, however, appears to have concluded otherwise,
stating that the Vietnamese revolutionary government which had expropriated certain property in Vietnam "also has the power to assert a claim
5
as the successor to an expropriated bank's foreign-based assets." 8
This conclusion seems to ignore the import of cases denying extraterritorial effect to foreign confiscatory decrees, 86 which thereby deny to
expropriating states the very power to which the judge alludes. Such states
have no legal right as successors in interest, and no judicial remedy will
be invoked to assist them in their claims. The expropriating state may, of
course (like the putative grantee in a fraudulent deed) have an independent
claim on the assets. Expropriation, however, confers no legal right enforceable in United States courts to property located in this country, even if the
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"act of state" doctrine compels judicial recognition of its effects elsewhere. 87
These cases seem to suggest that if at all relevant times Tran was the
owner of the bank's claims, then Vietnam had no cognizable interest in
them, and the blocking was improper. This implication does not in any
way turn on the presence or absence of Vietnam as a party before the court.
For if Tran owned the claims, his rights to them were protected property
rights, and depriving him of his property without compensation was a
constitutional violation.
Judge Schwarzer rules that, in the absence of a Vietnamese party to the
lawsuit before him, he was unable to reach the question of ownership. 88
The analysis suggested here would urge that the right to ownership wasor should properly have been-precisely the fundamental issue in Tran. If
the claims were the property of a Vietnamese national on or after the
effective date, the decision was correct; if, however, they were Tran's, no
basis exists in law for depriving him of them. There is no middle ground,
nor does the court suggest one: if the assets belonged to Tran, no lesser
interest on the part of Vietnam not rising to the level of a property interest
could constitutionally have been asserted to justify the continued blocking.
The right, then, that Tran raised was the right to claim his property. In
order to enforce such a right, as against another claimant to the property,
a plaintiff must normally show that his title is superior to that from which
the defendant derives his competing claim. OFAC's blocking was predicated on the alleged ownership of the new government of Vietnam, or of some
Vietnamese entity, obtaining on or after the effective date. Tran's burden
was therefore to prove his title superior to that of a claimant not before
the court. Only the presence of Vietnam as a party to the action would
have been certain to preclude the judge from holding (as he did) that "the
validity of the confiscation is not in issue." 89
Given the absence of Vietnam from the case before it, the court paid the
customary deference to the administrative agency, and declined to look
behind the exercise of its powers. Since the court ruled that the ultimate
disposition of frozen assets was a matter into which it could not inquire,
it refused to hear plaintiff's arguments based on public policy.
The following strategy might have increased the likelihood of Vietnam's appearance before the court. While it might not have reversed the
outcome of the case (which, given the strength of the court's apparent
conviction, might well have been reached for different reasons), it would
at least have forced an adjudication of Tran's underlying rights. This
strategy would have had as its objective the confrontation of the partiesTran and the Vietnamese government-who were asserting rights that
were mutually exclusive.
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The model proposed is that of Palicio v. Brush & Bloch9" and its sequel,
Menendez, Garcia v. Faber, Coe & Gregg. 9' Plaintiffs in the Menendez case were
former owners of Cuban cigar companies, expropriated by Fidel Castro in
1960.92 At the time of the expropriation, the companies were owed money
on several months' invoices for cigars previously shipped to buyers in the
United States.
Plaintiffs filed actions in New York in 1961 against the American cigar
importers, claiming past and future accounts receivable. They apparently
relied upon the traditional notion of equity jurisprudence that he who
obtains property illegally is liable to its true owner for his profits. Immediately, the government of Cuba intervened. It did so by filing suit, in the
names of the nationalized companies, against the law firm representing
their former owners, challenging their right to bring the debt-collection
actions in the corporate names.
Judge Frederick van Pelt Bryan declined to assess the validity of an
official Cuban act as it affected property in Cuba. He therefore held that
the expropriation was effective to vest title to property located in Cuba in
the Cuban Government. It was not effective, however, to divest the former
owners of their assets located in the United States. These included certain
industrial property rights, and, as it turned out, significant debts for cigars
shipped prior to expropriation.
The debt-collection actions with which the litigation commenced were
then reinstated, 93 with two classes of plaintiffs, now claiming rights to
different property: the former owners, seeking payment of pre-expropriation debts, and the revolutionary government, attempting to collect on
post-expropriation invoices. Obviously, these plaintiffs did not have similar interests.
All of the importers were able to demonstrate that in fact they had paid
the Cuban Government for all cigars shipped by the former owners in the
ninety days prior to the nationalization on September 15, 1960. They
argued that such payment represented proper performance of their obligations, even if they acted in error as to the correct identity of their creditors.
Judge Bryan rejected this defense, holding that "the payments made on
account of pre-[expropriation] shipments by the importers did not discharge the importers' obligations to make payment to the owners for such
shipments." 94 Payment made in error does not settle a debt, especially
when the debtor has knowledge (actual or constructive) of his mistake.
Thus the former owners were held entitled to the proceeds of the shipments, and the importers were allowed to deduct these amounts from
judgments awarded against them in favor of the Cuban government (the
erroneous payee). 95 By holding that the former owners were entitled to
certain assets and the new owners-the government-to others, the judge
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established and clearly distinguished the legal rights of expropriator and
expropriated.
The Palicio/Menendezapproach might usefully have been applied in Tran.
Like the Menendez plaintiffs, Tran claimed he was owed money on contractual debts that accrued before nationalization. Had he filed suit on those
debts, against the debtor (in this case, the Department of the Army), 96 the
defendant would presumably have argued that it paid its debt, by writing
checks to the Dong Phuong Bank and by depositing such checks in blocked
accounts. Plaintiff's rejoinder would have been that he, and not the bank,
was the owner of the claims, and that the Army was aware of this. He
would have sought to establish his property interest by raising the April
15, 1975 resolution, and by contending that the unrestricted right to dispose of assets without accounting to anyone for them is the legal equivalent of outright ownership. The expropriation of the bank in Saigon
cannot, according to Palicio, have affected title to property, including accounts receivable, in the United States.
Therefore, the former owners of the bank, those who were expropriated, remained entitled to payment on the underlying contractual obligations. They, in their resolution, decided to grant that and other property
to Tran. Whether the resolution was legally effective to wind up the bank
is entirely beside the point. The payment to the bank was in error, and
Tran should have recovered under Menendez.
Had such a litigation strategy been employed, Vietnam would probably
have sought to intervene to raise the argument asserted in Palido: that its
governmental acts are unreviewable by an American court. But this argument probably would not have prevailed over the right of a litigant to the
ownership of his property. Such a Vietnamese intervention would have
put what Judge Schwarzer called "the validity of the confiscation" directly
in issue.
To follow this reasoning, however, is to see at once how unnecessary
such a step is to the legal analysis, and therefore to the resolution, of the
case. The judge implies that the confiscation is an act the legal consequences of which cannot be gauged in the absence of its perpetrator. But
this is beside the point, for United States law will recognize no legal effect
of such an act upon property in this country. Title remains where it was,
and he who holds it may dispose of his property as he likes.
The foregoing analysis suggests that Tran was wrongly decided. If Tran
was the owner of the property in issue, he was entitled to its unfettered
use, and the blocking was improper (i.e., there was no Vietnamese national
with an "interest" in it). In fact, Tran had a better claim to ownership than
the person (the Vietnamese Government, as putative successor in interest
to the bank) from whom the competing claim derived. At the instant
Saigon fell, the directors' resolution, given Tran's presence outside Viet-
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nam, automatically vested title to the bank's then-existing assets in him
and in his fellow directors who were then or who would subsequently be
able to emigrate. Since the vesting in him, at least, antedated the effectiveness of the regulations, his right to ownership of the bank's unexpropriated
assets should not have been denied. The property of refugees cannot be
taken from them ever by action of the executive, and the court's deference
to the "foreign affairs powers" cannot condone that constitutional defect. 97
A discussion of the Tran case in terms of rights may illuminate its more
obscure comers, and may help to show where and why the decision went
wrong. The message for litigation counsel representing such refugees as
Tran is clear: when foreign affairs statutes and regulations are concerned,
counsel can expect arguments of policy to be raised in force to suggest that
what rights the refugee client has are somehow predicated upon the discretion or the generosity of the executive. But where there is a right, there
is a remedy.

THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF REFUGEES: A STRATEGY
As the analyses of Filarfigaand Tran demonstrate, rights lie at the heart of
legal assistance to refugees. Legal rights, with their correlative remedies,
must not be outweighed by considerations of policy. Those in the private
bar who represent such persons, suing to vindicate claims in the United
States, should accustom themselves to conducting a preliminary investigation of underlying rights. Once they have accomplished this, they should
wherever possible bttild their cases on the foundation of legally enforceable rights, a form of argument well known to judges.
The case studies presented here suggest the following guidelines:
(1) "Common law" rights of refugees should be pursued through creative "common
lawyering. ""Common law" rights-the right to have a contract honored, or
not to be the victim of a tort-may be the real essence of the case. Perhaps
the complaint and pleadings can be framed keeping those central images
in focus, and consigning potentially controversial international aspects to
the periphery. Perhaps, for example, the complaint can be drafted in such
a way that the defendant's assertion of sovereign immunity will seem less
than inevitable. Perhaps, by contrast with the claimed rights of the plaintiff, the defendant's case can be made to appear founded upon a legal
technicality. Defendant should be perceived as relying upon international
comity in order to avoid having to comply with the most basic of domestic
legal obligations.
(2) Internationallaw should be canvassed as a source of legal rights. Filarfigapoints
lawyers toward consensus in the international arena as the source of rights
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enforceable in the United States. While the set of such rights may not be
large at the present time, the tendency is certainly toward its expansion.
Evidence of this may be found in the growing number of international
governmental organizations and commissions concerned with human
rights, the proliferation of treaties, resolutions, and conventions, and the
growing importance of and respect for such nongovernmental organizations as Amnesty International.
As individual rights become enshrined and established in international
law, they are automatically enforceable in American courts, according to
Filartiga.Advocates representing refugees might well join forces with legal
scholars in an effort to prepare a "status report" on the various individual
human rights, showing the degree of their (official) recognition, and noting
the nature of any obstacle to unanimity.
(3) Where statutes and regulationsare concerned, one should not hesitate to appeal to
their realfoundation. It is true that the president, and therefore the executive
agencies, have enormous latitude in conducting the foreign affairs of the
United States. It does not follow that this latitude is unlimited. Indeed,
executive authority under foreign relations statutes is subject to the rule
of law, and must be exercised in a way that fully comports with the laws
and the Constitution.
It cannot be predicted that a district court will strike down a foreign
affairs regulation (or its application) merely because an argument can be
raised that it leads to an unintended or even an inequitable result. 98 But
such a decision becomes more likely where fundamental rights are shown
to be implicated. This course is not an easy one, as may be seen in Tran,
but it is one worth pursuing. The Constitution does not tolerate discrimination in the recognition of basic rights (such as the right to own and enjoy
property) merely because of one's country of origin, unless there is a strong
and proven connection between the denial of those rights and a legitimate
statutory purpose.
An appeal, where possible, should be founded on both the underlying
right and that fundamental purpose. 99 And again, the court should be
presented with the controversy in a way designed to accentuate the legal
rights of the refugee plaintiff.
(4) Legal rights are by their nature enforceable, so the existence of rights, not remedies,
should be emphasized. A court recognizes a right; it invokes or orders a remedy.
Given the natural (and fully understandable) tendency of the courts to
decide no more than is required, it seems better strategy to show the judge
that the right plaintiff alleges is a well established one. Once the right has
been demonstrated, if an infringement is proved, the plaintiff is entitled
to his remedy.
The opposite approach, one which lays emphasis on the award the court
is asked to grant, raises controversy too early. It does not allow the court
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to ask-much less to answer-the question whether plaintiff is entitled to
any relief at all. It is likely to remind the judge of the uniqueness of the
challenge being mounted, and thereby to set him on his guard. Moreover,
it reduces the chances of getting a favorable decision that is sufficiently
well-founded to withstand an appeal.
Concentration on rights is a solid, practical approach that functions in
a wide variety of civil litigation. Cases involving refugees are especially
amenable to this analysis. For these are persons whose legal rights, both
international and municipal in origin, are most frequently and egregiously
trampled. If our judicial system cannot be mobilized to vindicate the legal
rights of refugees, then that system is far less consistent, complete, and
compassionate than many of us continue, despite everything, to believe.
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of course, that jurisdiction cannot lie. See the court's discussion of defendant's confusion on
this point, 630 F.2d at 889, and especially n. 25. The potential constitutional problem is the
lack of an American law under which the case "arises."
48 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
49 See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897).
50 630 F.2d at 890. The court's discussion of "act of state" was offered "in passing," since
the issue was "not before us on this appeal." Id. at 889.
51 Brief of the International Human Rights Law Group, et aL., at 28. See Note, 13 INT'L
LAW. 739, 746 (1979).
52 That is, to assert this defense, the nation would have to drape the mantle of sovereignty
around the defendant, espousing him as its official and his act as within his scope of responsibilities.
53 630 F.2d at 887 n. 22. Amici Amnesty International et at. were the only ones to brief
the question of possible section 1331 jurisdiction.
54 630 F.2d at 881.
55 In Rodriguez v. Wilkinson, No. 80-3183 (D.Kan. December 31,1980), appeal docketed,
No. 81-1238 (10th Cir., February 27, 1981) Judge Richard D. Rogers granted a writ of habeas
corpus to an undocumented Cuban immigrant indefinitely detained in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth. Relying in part on Filartiga, the judge found that arbitrary and
indeterminate detention "is prohibited by customary international law." Slip op. at 20.
56 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
57 31 C.F.R. Part 500. A much fuller explanation of the regulations appears in Malloy,
The Impact of U.S.Control of Foreign Assets on Refugees and Erpatriates,this volume.
58 40 Stat. 411. The relevant presidential authority under the Trading With the Enemy
Act, § 5, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 (Supp. III 1979), has since been revised by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977), codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 1111979) and other sections of 50 U.S.C. The new statute preserves intact
the authority discussed in the text. The Tran case concerns the 1917 Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder.
59 469 F. Supp. at 1205.
60 469 F. Supp. at 1208.
61 Id.
62 469 F. Supp. 1202 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
63 469 F. Supp. at 1207-08. Plaintiff did not argue that the resolution of April 15 was a
legal act of dissolution by the bank.
64 See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
65 F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush and Bloch, 256 F. Supp. 481, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd mem., 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1968). The situs of a debt,
such as the assets at issue in Tran, is with the debtor.
66 469 F. Supp. at 1210.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69
T.I.A.S. No. 4890; 12 U.S.T. 1704, art IV. The court held that "the Republic of Vietnam"
was no longer in existence. 469 F. Supp. at 1211.
70 Trading With the Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 411, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (Supp. 111979).
71 See, e.g., United States v. Broverman, 180 F. Supp. 631, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (there is
a Chinese "interest" in goods merely by virtue of their manufacture in China). In U.S. v.
Quong, 303 F.2d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 1962), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[t]he
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term 'any interest' must be defined in the broadest sense and includes any interest whatsoever, direct or indirect." But see Heaton v. United States, 353 F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1965) (it
is reasonable to distinguish between pre-effective date exports in which there is no "interest"
and later exports in which an "interest" is present).
72 A "national emergency" was declared by President Truman on December 16,1950, and
continued in existence until Congress terminated it through the National Emergencies Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1976), on September 14, 1976. Existing assets
blocking programs were expressly continued by the Act, § 502(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976).
73 See, e.g., Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 319, 320 (1936). See
also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957) (the United States "has no power except that granted
by the Constitution"); Toledo, P. & W. R.R. v. Stover, 60 F. Supp. 587, 593 (S.D. IlI. 1945)
("[tihe executive department of our government cannot exceed the powers granted to it by
the Constitution and the Congress, and if it does exercise a power not granted to it, or
attempts to exercise a power in a manner not authorized by statutory enactment, such
executive act is of no legal effect").
75 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
76 See, e.g. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The history and
scope of the "political question" doctrine, especially as it concerns the president's foreign
affairs authority, is discussed in L. HENKIN, FOREirN AFFAIRS AND THE CoNsTITuTION (1972). See
also Gordon, American Courts, InternationalLaw and "'PoliticalQuestions" Which Touch Foreign Relations,
14 INT'L LAW 297 (1980).
77 510 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1975), reh. denied, 514 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1975). Both Real and
Richardson (infra note 81 and accompanying text), as well as Sardino(supranote 73), concern the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515 (1980), assertedly promulgated under the
same authority as, and identical in relevant parts to, the regulations at issue in Tran.
78 31 C.F.R. § 515.327 (1980).
79 510 F.2d at 564.
80 510 F.2d at 565. The court gave as an example regulations out of harmony with their
authorizing statutes, citing Ruiz v. Morton, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
81 560 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1977), app. dismissed, 435 U.S. 939 (1978).
82 Exec. Order 12170,44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (1979). See31 C.F.R. § 535 (1980) (Iranian Assets
Control Regulations).
83 In fact, the president's authority has been judicially confined in at least one case in the
area of Iranian assets control: seeNational Airmotive Corp. v. Government of Iran, 499 F. Supp
401 (D.D.C. 1980), although it has been fully sustained in other Iranian assets cases. This
matter is almost certain to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in the near future.
84 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
85 469 F. Supp. at 1209.
86 Seenote 65 supra and accompanying text. See alsoRepublicof Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank,
353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966) ("When property confiscated is
within the United States at the time of the attempted confiscation, our courts will give effect
to acts of state 'only if they are consistent with the policy and law of the United States,"'
353 F.2d at 51).
87 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
88 Judge Schwarzer found support for the positing of a Vietnamese "interest" in the case
of Nielsen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 424 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But in Nielsen, the act
causing claims to the blocked assets to devolve upon shareholders (i.e., the nationalization)
occurred, and, indeed, the relevant debts accrued, after the regulations were in effect, and
hence after the required Cuban "interest" in them was established. The judge held that this
"mere fact" does not distinguish Nielsen. 469 F. Supp. at 1209.
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89 469 F. Supp. at 1210. See text at note 66 supra.
90 256 F. Supp 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
91 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), revd as to ot1her issues sub nom., Menendez v. Saks & Co.,
485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 991 (1976).
92
These facts are best set out in the two district court opinions, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
93 Thus, the consolidated Menendez cases, though filed first, were decided after the Cuban
Government challenge in Palicjo.
94 345 F. Supp. at 542.
95 The question whether this setoff procedure could sustain a net award against Cuba
(i.e., where the mistaken payment exceeded the affirmative award) went up to the Supreme
Court, where it was decided in a landmark case concerning the "act of state" doctrine. Alfred
Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
96 It appears, from the reported decision and the briefs filed on appeal, that the positions
of the Army and the Navy may have been significantly different. The Navy apparently paid
its debt to a contractor, who turned the money over to Tran under an assignment agreement.
The Army (which was responsible for nearly 90% of the total amount claimed) paid into a
blocked account. When Tran applied to unblock the Army funds, OFAC moved to block the
Navy payment as well. See 469 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
97 This analysis assumes that blocking is constitutionally equivalent to taking. While Tran
and some other cases (e.g., Sardinosupranote 73) assert the contrary, that view seems to be born
not of conviction and analysis but of deference to executive authority.
98 See, for example, the general unblocking license enjoyed by partners in former Cuban
business enterprises, but not by shareholders in limited liability companies. 31 C.F.R. §
515.557. This distinction seems to have little basis in logic, yet it is unlikely that its a~bitrariness is of such a scale that it would be struck down by a court.
99 In Tran, and in numerous other assets control cases, this approach has not been
successful. Judge Schwarzer's decision recites the articulated policies behind the regulations,
469 F. Supp. 1209 n.1, but merely concludes that those policies are met if the assets are ones
"in which Vietnam may assert an interest." This, of course, assumes the outcome of the case.

